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BENIGN NEGLECT RECONSIDERED
RICHARD L. MARCUSe
My theme for
discussing
Professor Cope'spaper
Cooper's p
1.is prompted by
My dicusingProessr
hem
fo

the impending retirement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Many
may recall how he first came to broad public attention. In January
1969, as an advisor to President-elect Richard Nixon, Moynihan wrote
a memorandum concerning the course the new President should
adopt toward race relations in the wake of the civil rights activism of
the 1960s. Borrowing the Earl of Durham's 1839 suggestion for the
British attitude toward Canada,2 Moynihan recommended that the
new administration pursue a policy of "benign neglect."
After the New York Times obtained a copy of the memorandum and
'4
published it s Time reported that "the document caused a sensation.
Noting that Moynihan was a long-standing Democrat who had served
in the Johnson Administration and was "generally regarded as the
most liberal of close Presidential advisers," the Wall Street Journal
opined on "Mr. Moynihan's Apostasy."' It concluded that the memorandum was leaked to enrage civil rights leaders "because of the incendiary phrase."6 Anthony Lewis opined that African Americans
would rightly interpret neglect as hostile,7 and the Times editorially

t Horace 0. Coil ('57) Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of Law. Since 1996, I have served as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules in connection with its review of the discovery rules, but not its study of
Rule 23. The views expressed in this Commentary are entirely my own and do not reflect the views of the Advisory Committee, or any of its members. I am indebted to
Mary Kay Kane for her comments on a section of this paper. This Commentary is
based on a presentation at the Mass Torts Symposium held at the University of Pennsylvania on November 11-12, 1999.
' See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1943 (2000).
2.See Peter Kihss, "BenignNeglect" on Race Is Proposed by Moynihan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1970, at 1 (reporting that Moynihan told an interviewer that he drew the phrase from a
report by the Earl of Durham that concluded that Canada had become more competent in governing itself "through many years of benign neglect").
3 See Text of the Moynihan Memorandum on the Status of Negroes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1,
1970, at 69.
4 Moynihan s Memo Fever,TIME, Mar. 23, 1970, at 15.
' Mr.Moynihan s Apostasy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1970, at 8.
6 Id.
SeeAnthony Lewis, Neglect-Benign orHostile?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1970, at 36.

(2009)
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concluded that the phrase "may have been felicitous when applied to
Canada by the Earl of Durham in 1839 but it suggests no program for
black America in 1970. ' Congress also discussed the implications of
the memorandum.9
So anyone who borrows the Earl of Durham's phrase another time
must do so diffidently. Yet the procedures that undergird the debate
about mass tort litigation also owe much to a different form of 1960s
activism-active employment of the federal courts to foster multiparty
litigation. The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were partly designed to
facilitate civil rights litigation, 1° and the framers were certainly aware
of the possible use of the new provisions of Rule 23 (b) (3) in mass accident litigation.' The 1968 adoption of the Multidistrict Litigation
Act12 embraced another theme of the era-achieving efficiency by
combining federal lawsuits from across the land. The combination of
these two creations of the Sixties has proved critical to much of current mass tort litigation.
Since the Sixties there have been proposals to change Rule 23, but
these have not been adopted except for one relatively small provision.' 3 Regarding legislation and rulemaking, therefore, it seems that
benign neglect has been the order of the day,14 even in the face of increasing enthusiasm in some quarters for action to respond to the
challenges of mass torts. In 1991, for instance, the Judicial Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation concluded that
there was a "litigation impasse [that] cannot be broken except by ag-

8 Editorial, Neglect-But Not "Benign,"N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1970, at 40.
9 It appears that the memorandum was discussed in Congress, and it is reproduced
at least twice in the Congressional Record. See 116 CONG. REc. 6070-71 (1970) (reproducing the text printed in the N.Y. TIMES, supra note 3, at 69); 116 CONG. REC. 6124-25
(1970) (reproducing the same text); see also 116 CONG. REC. 7339 (1970) (reproducing
Mr. Moynihan'sApostasy, supranote 5).
"9See 7A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. M=.LER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775, at 470 (2d. ed, 1996) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILR
& KANE] ("[S]ubdivision (b) (2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 primarily to facilitate the
bringing of class actions in the civil rights area.").
" Of course, they expressed their opposition to that sort of class action. See infra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion.
12 Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1994)).
's See infranote 49 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. ClV. P. 23 (f)).
14 Of course, Congress has acted in the specialized area of securities fraud litigation. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (modifying some aspects
of securities-fraud class actions).
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gregate or class proceedings," 15 and urged Congress to act to resolve
the problem.16 That did not happen, and the courts were left to improvise using existing procedural tools. In 1999, Chief Justice
Rehnquistjoined the Court's decision in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp. decrying the "elephantine mass of asbestos cases, but added a separate
opinion concluding that the Court's rejection of a class action settlement designed to solve those problems was correct because "we are
not free to devise an ideal system for adjudicating these claims." 9 Accordingly, "[u]nless and until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
revised, the Court's opinion correctly states the existing law."20 Perhaps this was an invitation from on high to change the rules.
Much study has been done on how an "ideal system" might be designed, and how Rule 23 might be amended to further that goal.
Throughout the 1990s, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has
been considering possible changes to Rule 23. Shortly after Chief
Justice Rehnquist's call for action in Ortiz, there were hearings in
Congress about a possible solution to the asbestos litigation problem. 2
Professor Cooper's paper moves beyond asbestos litigation to propose a statutory "all-encompassing" solution to the problems of mass
tort litigation. In addition, it proposes a rule revision that would not
" JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TEE U.S., REPORT OF THE AD

Hoc

COMMMrrFEE ON

ASBESTOS LITIGATION 19 (1991).
16 See id. at 32-34.
' 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
'8
Id.
at 2324 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quotingJustice Souter's majority opinion, 119 S. Ct. at 2302).
19 Id.
20a
21

The commencement of this review in connection with mass torts was in 1991. See

Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LrITG. 79
(1994) (describing 1991-1994 considerations of the Advisory Committee about amending the rule). In 1996, the Committee produced proposed amendments to Rule 23
that were published for public commentary. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559-66 (1996).
After the period of public comment on those proposals wvas completed, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist appointed a Working Group on Mass Torts consisting of representatives of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and a number of other Judicial Conference committees, and that group submitted a report to the ChiefJustice on February 15, 1999,
recommending the appointment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Mass Torts to continue
this work. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS,
REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 69-70 (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION]. As of this writing, the ChiefJustice has not appointed such a

committee.
See Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Cases in for Overhaulby Lawmakers, N.Y. TiMES, June
28, 1999, at Al (reporting that Congress would hold hearings on how to deal with the
problems presented by asbestos litigation).
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require statutory facilitation. For those in a position to act on these
suggestions, the question is whether the time for benign neglect has
passed. To shed light on that question, this Commentary will play
devil's advocate and present the arguments for adhering to a policy of
benign neglect.
I. BENIGN NEGLECT IN THE PAST
Before addressing the current proposals, it is important to recall
our experience with benign neglect during the last quarter century.
This is not the first time there have been urgent calls for class action
reform. To the contrary, twenty-five years ago there was what Arthur
Miller called a "holy war" over Rule 2 3 .2 The criticism took discordant themes. One decried the "enabling" features of the 1966
amendments. It was typified by Milton Handler's denunciation of antitrust class actions as "legalized blackmail,"2 4 and the condemnation
of the Eisen class action as a "Frankenstein Monster posing as a class
action."2s Others found that there was too much restraint on the
availability of class actions. Writing in the ColumbiaLaw Review, a representative of the Department ofJustice urged that class action reform
was necessary to end "[s]ubstance's [i]ndenture to [p]rocedure.2S
He decried the ability of defendants to frustrate class certification by
challenging the existence or predominance of common questions, or
by attacking the adequacy of representation afforded by the person
who brought the suit.2

Faced with this turmoil, the Advisory Committee concluded that
any modification of class action practice should come from Congress,

Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and ShiningKnights: Myth, Reality, and
the "ClassAction Problem, "92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 664 (1979).
24 Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971). It is
worth noting that this phrase continues to be used by class action opponents. See L.
Stuart Ditzen, CarmakerSues Over Liability Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 12, 1999, at
B1 (reporting on a suit filed by an automobile manufacturer against lawyers who had

earlier sued the carmaker, and quoting a representative of the manufacturer who said
that "[f]or too long, trial lawyers have been exploiting class actions, turning these lawsuits into a form of legalized blackmail").
25 Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, CJ.,
dissenting).
26 See Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for

Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 (1980)
(critiquing class damage action procedure).
2 See id. at 302-12.

HeinOnline -- 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2012 1999-2000

2000]

BENIGN NEGLECT RECONSIDERED

2013

a position approved by the Judicial Conference.!" The Department of
Justice proposed legislation to rectify the problems that it believed affected class action practice, but that bill was not adopted. In effect,
benign neglect became the order of the day.
Yet the roof did not fall in. In part, this was due to restrictive Supreme Court class action decisions on subject matterjurisdiction notice to class members in Rule 23(b) (3) class actions,3 1 and appellate
jurisdiction.312 But more generally, as predicted by Professor Miller in
1979, it seems that the courts mastered the difficulties presented by
Rule 23. Miller noted that there had first been a period of "euphoria
over the rule's potential" among the legal community in the second
half of the 1960s during which not enough attention was paid to the
rule's requirements.ss This initial period of excitement was followed
by a period of reaction from about 1969 to 1974 when "antipathy to
the class action became palpable" among courts.34 Miller believed that
the pendulum then began to swing again, and that we then entered a
phase during which "[i] nstead of wielding a meat axe, courts increasingly... operat[ed] with a scalpel.""' In his view, benign neglect
would work. When the RAND Corporation announced its class action
See Miller, supranote 23, at 684 & n.86.
For a discussion of this proposed legislation, see Berry, supranote 26, at 321-43.
See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that in
state-law class action, the claim of each class member must satisfy the amount-incontroversy requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 nullified Zahn, but affirmed
when Justice O'Connor recused herself and neither side could muster a majority to
resolve the question. SeeFree v. Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that § 1367 overturned Zahn and allowed a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over members of a class although they did not meet the amount-incontroversy requirement, as did the class representatives), affld by an equally divided
court, 120 S. Ct. 1578 (2000). Other courts have held that § 1367 did not nullify Zahn.
See, e.g., Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999). For
discussion, see James Pfander, SupplementalJurisdictionand Section 1367: The Casefor a
Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 148-49 (1999).
3' See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1974) (holding that all
identifiable class members had to be notified of the suit individually by first class mail
rather than by publication).
32See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1978) (rejecting the
"death knell" doctrine that some courts of appeals had used to justify immediate appellate review of district court denial of class certification, and holding that review would
be available under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 only after entry of final judgment in the individual
action remaining after denial of class certification, even if that would never happen
because denial of class status was indeed the death knell of the suit).
3 Miller, supra note 23, at 678-79.
4 Id. at 679.
2'

'5Id. at 680.
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study in 1999, it seemed to confirm that Miller's prediction had
proved correct: "[A] s the years passed, the legal system gradually acclimated itself to the 1966 rule. Courts pulled back from their initial
enthusiastic support, litigation patterns became more predictable and
therefore easier for corporations to adjust to, and the clamor for rule
revision died down."6 Indeed, things became so tranquil that
in 1988
17
the New York Times reported that class actions were "dying."
Shortly after Professor Miller wrote, however, seeds of new turmoil
about class actions were sown. The opening shot was fired in 1981 by
Judge Spencer Williams in San Francisco, who was presiding over personal injury suits brought by users of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive
device. Appreciating the prospect of burgeoning mass tort litigation,m
Judge Williams saw Rule 28 as the key to a cure. He therefore certified a nationwide mandatory class action for punitive damages and a
statewide Rule 23(b) (3)opt-out class action for compensatory damages for California users of the Dalkon Shield. He saw class treatment
as essential to avoid the "unconscionable possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who are not first in line at the courthouse door will
be deprived of a practical means of redress."s9 When the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 23 did not permit what he had done, Judge Williams wrote an article lamenting the possible demise of mass tort class
actions and forecasting that "until Congress addresses these questions
by enacting comprehensive federal products liability law.., the inequities and shortcomings of the present system require that we judges

36DEBORAH R HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: EXECUTIvE SUMMARY 1
(1999).
37 Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1988, at B7.
3SJudge Williams's forecast anticipated the views that would become widespread by
the end of the 1980s:
The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed a virtual explosion in
the frequency and number of lawsuits filed to redress injuries caused by a single product manufactured for use on a national level. Indeed, certain products have achieved such national notoriety due to their tremendous impact on
the consuming public, that the mere mention of their names-Agent Orange,
Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon Shield-conjure images of massive litigation,
corporate stonewalling, and infrequent yet prevalent, "big money" punitive
damage awards.
In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons
suffering the same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a defendant is becoming increasingly frequent.
In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887,
892 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'u, 698 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
39Id. at 893.
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work in an innovative fashion, adapting aspects of the current system
to address these challenging problems.""
Judge Williams was right about judicial innovation; as Professor
Cooper says, the courts have been "remarkably inventive" in addressing the problems of mass tort litigation with existing procedural
tOOlS.4Q As I have written elsewhere, federal judges engaged in this effort often seemed animated by a substantive preference to subordinate punitive damages to compensatory relief and to ensure that priority in obtaining relief would be given to those suffering the most
serious injuries.4 These efforts have relied not only on Rule 23, but
also the power of the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to combine
federal cases under § 1407, most prominently evidenced in the 1991
order transferring all asbestos personal injury actions to Philadelphia.4
There seem again to have been some elements of overenthusiasm
in this process of creativity. It is chilling, for example, to learn of the
insouciance exhibited by the district judge who certified a mandatory
class action in Bendectin litigation in 1984.4 This early experience
seems to parallel the "euphoria" Professor Miller detected in the wake
of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23.s There has surely been a retrenchment in the 1990s. The Supreme Court has twice struck down
class action settlements in asbestos litigation.46 The courts of appeals
have proved inhospitable to mass tort class certification as well.47 In
40 Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 325

(1983).
41 Cooper, supranote 1, at 1944.
4

See Richard L. Marcus, They Can'tDo That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80

CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859-66 (1995) (discussing the substantive undercurrent in fed-

eral mass tort class actions).
43 In reAsbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
' See MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHAlLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LTGATION 211-12 (1996) (describing certification of a mandatory
class in Bendectin litigation as a "judicial accommodation" to the settlement that was
embodied in a "hastily-drawn order" even though "there was little legal basis for the
certification of a rule 23(b) (1) class").
4 See supranote 33 and accompanying text.
" See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
47 See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (overturning certification of nationwide class of allegedly addicted smokers); In reAmerican
Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (overturning certification of nationwide
class of recipients of defendant's allegedly defective penile implants); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of mandate to overturn
certification of hemophiliacs infected with HIV virus in suit against manufacturers of
blood solids used by hemophiliacs that supposedly were source of infection); cf Valen-
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some instances, these courts appeared to distend prevailing doctrine
on appealability, 4 but the 1998 amendment to add Rule 23(f) 49 should
provide a ready avenue for such review in the future. So if there was
too much enthusiasm for certifying mass tort class actions initially, it
does seem that the over-enthusiasm has been reined in, and that a period of balanced treatment might result from more frequent appellate
review under Rule 23 (f).
Somewhat similarly, the Supreme Court's decision that transfer
for trial is not permitted under § 1407 may put the brakes on overly
aggressive use of the transfer device to combine cases.S0
Altogether, these developments show that the attitude toward
mass tort combined litigation in federal court has changed significandy since the Advisory Committee began studying the problem in
1991. The period of enthusiasm that may have existed then has been
supplanted by a more skeptical view, and it is possible that more nuanced use of existing procedural devices will characterize the future if
benign neglect carries the day so far as legislation and rule amendment are concerned. Against that background, we can turn to Professor Cooper's specific proposals.
II.

THE "ALL-ENCOMPASSING" STATUTORY SOLUTION

Like others, proceduralists dream of all-encompassing solutions to
pressing problems, and Professor Cooper has shared his dream with
us. It weaves together a variety of existing devices. Because the objective is to resolve all claims, the proposal relies on the class action. To
manage the process, it drafts the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. But the closest analogy seems to be interpleader. In 1967, the
Supreme Court noted that "federal interpleader was not intended to
serve the function of a 'bill of peace' in the context of multiparty litigation arising out of a mass tort."5' That is exactly what Professor
tino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (overturning class certification on facts before it in nationwide suit alleging that pharmaceutical was defective,
but refusing to say that certification could never be proper for multistate personal injury class).
4' See e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1294 (granting writ of mandate over objections of dissenter that the extraordinary circumstances warranting use
of the writ were not present).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (authorizing immediate appeal of orders denying or granting class certification at discretion of court of appeals).
50 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 39
(1998) (holding that transferee courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 may not engage in selftransfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
'IState Farm Fire & Gas. Co.v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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Cooper's proposal is designed to do, however, and it is therefore to be
embodied in a new statute to be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1335A, right
after the provision setting forth the main ingredients of the current
interpleader.
A. What the ProposalDoesNot Do
Although Professor Cooper's proposal is "all-encompassing," it
fails to satisfy some of the concerns voiced by critics of mass tort litigation. It is therefore worthwhile to begin by identifying some prominent omissions.
1. Individual litigation will remain necessary, and may
even include class actions.
Critics of mass tort litigation have objected to dispersed repetitive
lawsuits about the same product. For those who emphasize maturity
as a necessary predicate for a reliable combined disposition, repetition
is essential until a clear pattern emerges. For example, with regard to
asbestos litigation, the Third Circuit recognized that "[t]he procedures of the traditional tort system proved effective in unearthing the
hazards of asbestos." 2 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court observed
that plaintiffs' lawyers "honed the litigation
of asbestos claims to the
53
point of almost mechanical regularity."
As noted below, the role of maturity under Professor Cooper's
new proposal is not entirely clear. It is clear, however, that some litigation must occur before the proposed procedure can be initiated.
Either 100 or more suits have to be filed or 100 claimants must assert
claims against the defendant invoking the new procedure.s As Profes52

In reSchool AsbestosLitig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3dCir. 1986).
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2303 (1999).

s The standard is described in two different ways. The statutory proposal says that
the new procedure can be invoked by a defendant "against whom more than 100 persons have asserted claims." Cooper, supra note 1, at 1953 (proposing 28 U.S.C. §

1335A(a)). But Professor Cooper's description says that the new procedure would not
be appropriate unless 100 actions were filed. See id. at 1960 (arguing that the 100action minimum is insufficient to merit use of the "heavy artillery" available in the statute).
Either approach has difficulties. Invoking the procedure as soon as 100 claimants
have asserted claims against the defendant could mean that the proposed mechanism

is available as soon as a class action involving a class of 100 or more class members is
filed, or at least when the class is certified. Requiring that 100 separate suits be filed
would prevent use of the procedure where ten overlapping class actions were filed on
behalf of thousands, of even millions, of claimants.
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sor Cooper recognizes, there is no limitation on plaintiff class actions
or other aggregated actions.55 If one wants to put an end to dispersed
or repetitive litigation, this solution is partial at best.
2. The proposal places no limitation on consumer class actions.
Some of the most vigorous criticisms of class actions have been directed at consumer class actions. Such actions bundle together thousands of small-claims plaintiffs, supposedly providing too much leverage to plaintiffs' lawyers. Recently, for example, there was much press
coverage about a settlement by Toshiba of a class action charging that
defendant's laptop computers had a flaw that could cause errors in
recording data onto floppy disks. Although it asserted that nobody
had even claimed that there was such a flaw until the suit was filed,
and that it could not duplicate the alleged fault in its laboratory under
normal operating conditions, Toshiba settled for an amount estimated to be $1 billion because a bad loss at trial could threaten the
company's existence. 6 Soon thereafter, it was reported that this settlement had inspired "copycat" class actions against other manufacturers who vowed to fight them.57
The possibility that the class action would force such a settlement
without regard to the merits is indeed troubling,58 but it is not addressed by this proposal, which is limited to claims for personal injury
or death, or for physical property damage. Cases like Toshiba's would
not be included. Of course, that follows from the fact that this proposal addresses mass torts and not other problems, but it is worth recalling that this "all-encompassing" solution does not deal with some
important areas of concern.

s-See id. (explaining that "there is nothing that prevents class actions filed by plaintiffs or other forms of aggregation from becoming mass tort[s] ....[because i] t is the
defendant's choice whether to invoke this new one-court, mandatory aggregation system").
56 See Andrew Pollack, Toshiba Faces $1 Billion Bill Over a Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1999, at Al (noting that according to Toshiba executives, potential liability could
have exceeded $9 billion).
17 See Evan Ranistad & David P. Hamilton, Toshiba's $2.1B Settlement
Inspires "Cpycat"Suits, S.F. DAILYJ., Nov. 3, 1999, at 7.
Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
ClassActions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 514-19 (1991) (finding that settlements in certified
securities class actions almost always are for essentially the same proportion of possible
damages, indicating that they are not motivated by the merits of the claims, which
cannot all be of the same strength). But cf Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108
HARv.L. REV. 438, 453 (1994) (questioning Alexander's methods and conclusions).
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3. There is no provision for controlling punitive damages
or ensuring that the worst go first.
Starting with Judge Williams in 1981,' 9 federal judges have regularly expressed uneasiness about the possibility that repeated punitive
damages awards could absorb funds that would better be spent on
compensating injured victims. Similarly, many have expressed dismay
that, at least in asbestos litigation, it often seems that claimants suffering no present impairment are receiving money while those facing
death are forced to wait.6°
The all-encompassing proposal contains no provisions for solving
these problems. Until the new procedure is invoked, there is no impediment to litigation as it now occurs. Once the procedure is invoked, it does provide for a stay of pending actions,6 1 but it has no
provision for subordinating punitive damages claims to compensation
claims or for granting priority to those worst injured. It may be that
one could expect a mass tort court presiding over the cases to look
with favor on these techniques, but there is nothing in the statute or
the commentary provided thus far that endorses that result
4. It does not preclude a sweetheart settlement of a class action.
Another abiding concern is the "reverse auction" possibility that a
defendant could locate a pliant plaintiffs' lawyer and arrange a global
class action settlement on favorable terms. 62 In large measure, this
problem results from the fact that such a lawyer cannot threaten to go
to trial unless the case is certified as a class action for litigation purposes, but certification for purposes of settlement may be available.
Because the new procedure authorized by § 1335A comes into play
only if the defendant initiates a mass tort action, there is nothing to
stop a defendant who prefers the collusive settlement from pursuing
that route if a pliantjudge can be found.
59 See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
60 See Peter M. Schuck, The Worst Should Go trs 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 541,
561 (1992) (urging that plaintiffs suffering the worst injuries be given precedence in
the court system).
61 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1954 (delineating the provisions of 28
U.S.C.
§ 1335A(f) as proposed).
62 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUm. L. REv. 1343, 1367-84 (1995) (discussing risk of collusive settlements). For
further elaboration on this and related topics, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: ReconcilingExit, Voice, and Loyalty in RepresentativeLegislation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 870 (2000).
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B. What the ProposalDoesDo
Though there are a variety of criticisms not addressed by Professor
Cooper's all-encompassing proposal, it is certainly not timid. To the
contrary, § 1335A includes several radical features and raises a number of questions about potentially unfortunate results should this solution to the problem of mass torts be adopted. We turn to those now.
1. It leads to a binding, no-opt-out decree as to all present
and future claimants and defendants.
The defendant invoking the new mass tort action procedure must
join all present and future claimants, all present and future defendants, and any insurer of any of those defendants possibly obliged to
indemnify.6 In furtherance of this broad rule ofjoinder, the broadest
possible personal jurisdiction is afforded.64 All pending actions are to
be stayed,65 and even a bankruptcy filing by one of the defendants
does not interrupt the mass tort proceedings, for it must be filed in
the district in which the mass tort action is pending.
This is truly a nuclear weapon for mass tort litigation problems. It
could result in a proceeding incomparably broader than any yet attempted. To put that observation in context, recall that the Supreme
Court called the class action in Amchem "sprawling," 67 and that the
Fifth Circuit in Castano said that tobacco suit "may be the largest class
action ever attempted in federal court. "8 Because both could be
dwarfed by what § 1335A contemplates, there is at least a reason to
pause.
Beyond that, consider the difficulties facing the party who attempts to file such a mass tort action. Section 1335A(d) declares that
the party filing the action must name all those who should be joined.
How much effort is required to identify those people? Current claimants may not be difficult to identify,6 9 but future claimants present
much greater difficulties for mass-marketed products. Naming all

63

See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1953-54 (§ 1335A(d)).

65

See id. at 1955 (§ 1335A(i)).
See id. at 1954 (§ 1335A(f)).
See ia at 1955 (§ 1335A(O).

67Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997).
6'Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).

69Note that if the defendant invoking the procedure is a small player in a large
industry, it may not be a party to a substantial proportion of the suits, thus making the

process of identifying claimants more difficult even as to current plaintiffs.
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parties possibly liable presents different sorts of difficulties. How well
can a current defendant foresee all possible grounds for liability that
may be asserted? In asbestos litigation, for example, there was a period during which claims against tobacco producers were suggested,
either for contribution to asbestos producers or for direct liability to
claimants.70 Must a party inaugurating the new mass tort action be
imaginative enough to foresee all such developments?
2. It leaves the decision whether to authorize the mass tort action to
proceed to the judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which
must determine whether transfer under the
new procedure is "desirable."
The Panel must dismiss the proceeding if it is not properly
brought as a mass tort action. But the threshold for invoking the new
procedure has intentionally been set low-100 claimants seeking an
aggregate of $10,000,000, which could be satisfied in the case of a
plane crash 7 Professor Cooper correctly notes that this low threshold
presumes that parties eligible to invoke the new procedure will exercise a good deal of self restraint because they will not want to shoulder
the onerous burdens of initiation or maintenance of the mass tort action unless essential.72 Nonetheless, the possibility of bluffing suggests that proceedings may sometimes be initiated when they should
not.
That is presumably why the statute endows the Panel with discretion to dismiss if transfer is not "desirable." Professor Cooper is confident that the Panel "will enter this new regime with a wealth of experience with large-scale pretrial consolidations, and will develop
comparable experience that should support far more discerning decisions than any statute could dictate."7 4 The statute therefore provides
the Panel with virtually no guidance as to how it should make this decision. This paucity of authority stands in contrast to the extended list
of factors provided for deciding whether to approve class settle70

See, e.g., In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989) (addressing

discovery dispute resulting from filing of actions in state courts in many states against
tobacco companies claiming injury due to a combination of tobacco smoking and exposure to asbestos).
7' But see supra note 54 (discussing the difference between requiring
that there be
100 claimants or 100 suits).
See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1960.
73 See comment 4 below in this section for a discussion of the potential for bluffing
by defendants about use of the new procedure.
74Cooper, supra note 1,at 1962 (footnote omitted).
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ments. 75 Given the magnitude of the task of adjudicating a mass tort
action, one could well wish for more guidance. If there are criteria, it
would be good to set them out, and if there are no criteria that can be
set out, this proposal asks Congress to confer an astonishing amount
of almost unreviewable authority on the Panel.
3. It directs the mass tort court to grasp the choice-of-law nettle.
This proposal builds on other choice-of-law proposals for mass tort
7
litigation, such as the one made by the American Law Institute. s Unless the Panel dismisses, it transfers the mass tort proceeding to a mass
tort court, which may in some instances be a state court. That court,
in turn, is required to choose the law of a single state or country to
govern all tort issues not governed by federal law.7 This choice-of-law
authority enables the mass tort court to overcome the obstacles to
class action treatment that often result from applying divergent state
law. Doing so, however, raises substantial federalism issues that are
emphasized by the fact that proposed § 1335A includes its own Mass
Torts Rules Enabling Act. Mass tort rulemaking would be liberated
from the constraints that usually prohibit rules that modify substantive
rights.78 The choice-of-law provision in § 1335A exempts federal law
from alteration by the mass tort court, but all substantive rights-including federal ones-would be up for grabs in the rulemaking process. The Amchem Court's concern with the differences in outcome in
different states7 is thus solved, but the broad consequences of the
change are similarly made clear.
Against this background, it is somewhat odd that no mention is
made of the federal courts' substantive preferences about punitive
75 See infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text. Compare also the list of factors

that bear on superiority for common question class actions under the current rule. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
76 See AMERIcAN LAW INsT., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS

AND ANALYSIs § 6.01 (1994) (proposing choice-of-law rules for mass tort cases).
See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1955 (§ 1835A(j)). This directive does not apply to
interpretation of insurance policies.
78Section 1335A(e), Cooper, supranote 1, at 1954, allows rulemaking subject to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074. Notably absent are the limits in 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), which forbid rules that modify substantive rights.
But compare Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 n.14, in which the Court noted that the
statewide average for mesothelioma recoveries in California is more than twice the
maximum allowed under the payment schedule in the settlement agreement. This
observation introduces even more uncertainty about the differences between states by
suggesting that one should consider not only the variations in legal doctrine but also
the habits ofjuries in different states.
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damages and ensuring that those suffering greater damages be allowed to go first. 8

One of the reasons for the federal courts' impa-

tience about these issues is concern that the states may not have taken
them seriously. As the Third Circuit remarked in 1986, states presented with these issues would probably act in "a parochial and nearsighted manner" because imposing a more equitable regime on their
own residents would simply disadvantage them compared to the residents of other less enlightened states."' So it is unlikely that the law of
any state would contain the ingredients that the federal courts have
sought. Still, the mass tort court could be influenced in its choice-oflaw decision by such substantive preferences. At least the mass tort
court is not allowed to apply the law of more than one state or country. If it were, it would have even greater latitude for substantive preferences, for it could cobble together a collection of legal doctrines
that reflect the judge's substantive preferences even though they do
not exist together in the law of any jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
overall consequence is to broaden the powers of federal judges and
rulemakers considerably.
The choice-of-law provision also has enormous strategic importance. Recall that the statute provides no guidance on whether the
Panel should dismiss. One possible criterion for that decision would
be whether the litigation is mature. It is easy to understand why that is
not included-if massive litigation is bound to follow, there is no reason to think the mass tort court cannot properly manage the sequence
of decision so that the claims are mature before class action treatment
is employed. At the same time, the choice-of-law provision means that
the filing of the mass tort action can change the ground rules in a very
significant way. For some litigants, the chosen law will be less desirable than that which would otherwise apply. Those eligible to file
mass tort actions therefore may be influenced by their expectations
about whether they will reap a favorable change in law by doing so.
The existence of the choice-of-law question therefore may be inconsistent with the desire for "maturity." Should decisions already
made under that other, more attractive, law be given any weight by the
mass tort court? If a state-court class action is about to reach judg-

80See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (describing preference to subordinate punitive damages to compensatory damages and to ensure that the worst go first).
81In reSchool Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1986) ("A forum wishing
to take the long-range view might find that its efforts were not only ineffective but unfair to its citizenry because claimants in the other states could drain off all the assets
available for satisfaction of claims.").
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ment, should that case be stayed pending the decision by the mass tort
court whether the law of that state should be applied? Indeed, if the
choice-of-law question remains an enigma until resolved by the mass
tort court, is there any reason for the Panel to give a thought to the
posture of litigation at the time the mass tort action is filed before it?
This sort of wild card might well cause considerable confusion.
4. It creates substantial opportunities for bluffing.
The new mass tort act would give every defendant the equivalent
of a litigation nuclear bomb. The Panel might dismiss a case that satisfies the statutory prerequisites on the ground that mass tort transfer
is not "desirable," but one could hardly be sure that would happen.
The statutory threshold for invoking the mass tort procedure is very
low, and one confronting unfavorable law or juries might well be inclined to use the weapon to her advantage.
In our New World Order, we worry about terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons. In a similar vein, one could consider whether we
might be arming some "terrorist" litigants with this nuclear weapon.
Professor Cooper sensibly suggests that "it does not seem likely that
many defendants will want to bring massive aggregation down on
themselves without a compelling need."" Although this argument
makes sense, it does not dispel concern about bluffing.
One possibility is bluffing directed at plaintiffs. A defendant
might use the threat of a mass tort filing to extract concessions from
plaintiffs who had obtained, or could reasonably expect to obtain,
success in conventional litigation if they feared that the mass tort action (and its choice-of-law consequences) posed a threat to those successes. Since a mass tort action could be initiated even after a finding
of liability, it would hang over all other proceedings, subject to the
possibility that the Panel would find that a mass tort proceeding is not
"desirable" in circumstances in which a completed proceeding in another court would be disrupted.
Another possible bluff is that the "weak sister" defendant might try
to extract concessions from other defendants by threatening to throw
the entire proceeding into a mass tort action. Recall that all defendants and all of their insurers would be sucked into such a proceeding. While a defendant might hesitate to bring this down on its own
head, it might see an advantage in threatening to bring a mass tort action down on the heads of a variety of well-heeled co-defendants and
82

Cooper, supra note 1, at 1960.
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insurers. At least a bluff to take such an action might benefit a party,
and those considering creating this new bluffing opportunity should
reflect on the potential costs that could result.
5. It requires elaborate and unprecedented revision of lines
of appellate review.
Arranging for appellate review always becomes more complicated
in proceedings that are moved from one place in the country to another. Proposed § 1335A takes that sort of complexity to a new level
because transfer by the Panel can be to a state court, 3 and issues that
relate only to individual claims may be transferred to any court competent to entertain the issues.s4 Thus, dispersed appeals could be a
possibility, as might review by a state appellate court (if a state court is
the mass tort court) of rulings by an Article III judge (if certain issues
are transferred to a federal court for resolution in connection with a
mass tort action entertained by a state court judge). The proposed
statute resolves these issues in a provision on appeals." In this way,
Professor Cooper tries to avoid results that would be "outside most
concepts of our federal structure,, 6 although he notes that some of
the results would be "startling."87 For present purposes, the problem
of appeal points out another way in which adopting this approach
would result in radical revision of our current system.
6. It contemplates requiring the court to identify and appoint as class
representatives "the most capable representatives available."
Seemingly taking the lead of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 8 the new Rule 23.3 proposed to accompany new § 1335A
directs the court to make a similar effort. 8, This is an understandable
objective given the stakes, but it is difficult to see how the court is to
do this job. In securities fraud actions, the starting point is to give a

84

See id. at 1953 (§ 1335A(c) (4)).
See id. at 1954 (§ 1335A(g)).

87

See id at 1955-56 (§ 1335A(m)).
Id. at 1971.
I.

m See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (Supp. II 1996) (directing the court to appoint
as lead plaintiff in securities fraud class action the person "most capable of adequately
representing the interests of class members").
89 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1958 (Proposed Rule 23.3(d) (2)) (requiring the
court to "assure that claimants designated as representatives are the most capable representatives available from the represented class or subclass").
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preference to the party with the largest financial stake in the suit.9
How could the court develop a similar rule of thumb in mass tort actions? Among those injured, claimants likely to have the largest claims
might be sensible choices, although one would expect them to be the
sickest. For a class of "future" plaintiffs who may not be represented
by those currently injured,9 it is even more difficult to determine
which claimant should be selected. Yet including this requirement
presumably makes failure to select the best person an argument for
opposing a settlement. Again, the requirements for this extraordinary
new proceeding emphasize the dramatic nature of its changes.

In sum, not only would significant objectives sought by many concerned with recent class action practice not be accomplished by this
proposal, 9' but its adoption would raise difficult and potentially dangerous new issues. 3 Accordingly, benign neglect might be the better
course and a more modest program of revising Rule 23 adopted instead.
III. THE RULE 23 ADJUSTMENT
Without any action by Congress, the Advisory Committee could
propose to modify Rule 23 further. It circulated proposed changes to
the rule in 1996. 9' Armed with the insights gained from that experience, the Advisory Committee could make different proposals, and
Professor Cooper has suggested several.95 As with the statutory proposal, one can look to what these proposals do and do not accomplish
to determine whether they provide a reason for action.

'0 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B)(iii) (I) (bb) (creating a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the person with the largest financial stake).
9' See Cooper, supranote 1, at 1957 (Proposed Rule 23.3(d) (1)) ("Claimants whose
claims have not yet accrued may not be included in a class with claimants who have
present claims.").
92

93

See supranotes 52-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.

9' See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559-66 (1996) [hereinafter Prelimary Draft].
95See Cooper, supranote 1, at 1981-89.
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A. What the ProposedRule Amendments Do Not Do
1. The amendments place no constraint on class
certification by state courts.
At most, federal rulemakers can alter practices in federal court.
But to the extent federal courts become less hospitable to activities
deemed abusive by some, those who wish to pursue similar objectives
may simply shift to state court. There is some reason to think that
they have been doing so.96 There is also some reason to believe that
certain states-perhaps even certain specific counties-97 --are magnets
for such activity.
Whether this side effect of federal rule revision should be considered important is debatable. Federal rulemakers hardly can constrain
their improvements in federal practice due to perceived deficiencies
in state court practice. Moreover, there is no reason to think that
states themselves are incapable of changing their ways. Alabama, for
example, recently enacted legislation to ensure that "drive-by certification" would no longer occur within its borders." So even if this factor
has weight, it may be that benign neglect is as effective as a more active stance.

Thus, the RAND Corporation reported as follows in 1999:
We found no quantitative data to permit us to calculate growth trends. But we
are persuaded by our interviews with plaintiff and defense counsel that there
has been a surge in damage class actions in the past several years, particularly
in state courts and in the consumer area. Many practitioners trace this growth
to the curbs on securities litigation enacted by Congress [in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] in 1995. Faced with these curbs, they say, plaintiff
attorneys looked for new types of suits to bring and found their opportunities
in consumer complaints against business practices and products.
HENSLERETAL., supra note 36, at 5.
During the Mass Torts Symposium at the University of Pennsylvania on November 11-12, 1999, it was suggested that there are around a dozen identifiable counties in
the country that are magnets for this sort of litigation.
93 1999 Ala. Acts 99-250 provides that a class action may not be certified without an
evidentiary hearing if any party requests one, and affords sixty days' notice of the hearing. It also directs Alabama courts to require the proponent of certification to satisfy
all the requirements of Alabama Rule 23, which is very similar to the Federal Rule 23.
It is clear, however, that previously some were very anxious to remain in Alabama
state court. See, e.g., Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 793 (11th
Cir. 1999) (involving class action in Alabama state court containing what the court calls
a "do not remove me disclaimer" in capital letters).
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2. The amendments offer no direction about whether to
certify a settlement class.
The proposed amendment to Rule 23(b) in effect "promulgates"
the result in Amchem without providing any guidance about how to
apply it. At least some believe that Amchem could be improved upon,"
and one could certainly want more direction about how it should be
applied. The proposed amendment offers nothing of the sort, however, in marked contrast to the detailed treatment of settlement approval proposed to be added to Rule 23(e). 100 Since the amendments
effectively do nothing that Amchem has not already done, one could
easily conclude that there is no need to make them.
3. The amendments offer no guidance on "limited fund" certification
under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) in the mass tort setting.
Some of us have long questioned whether the limited fund concept could ever be adapted to mass torts.10 1 Clearly the Court viewed
limited fund certification as central to its decision in Ortiz.'°2 Clearly
ChiefJustice Rehnquist thought that revisions to the rule could have
made a difference in the answer reached by the Court-that Rule
23(b) (1) (B) does not in current form permit the sort of certification
done by the judge.
So one purpose of amendment might be to revise the rule to facilitate limited fund certification in circumstances
like Ortiz, but that would entail confronting a variety of thorny policy
issues.
An alternative objective would be to clarify the criteria discussed
in Ortiz. On that score, it seems to this reader that the Court's opinion raises more than the usual number of questions that might be addressed by amendments to the rule. Undoubtedly others have their
own favorites, but here is a partial list:

See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: ImprovingAmchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIo ST. LJ. 1155 (1998). This is an
illustration, not a recommendation for adopting some specific proposal.
100 See infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
101 See Marcus, supra note 42, at 877-81 (detailing difficulties with applying Rule
23(b) (1) (B) in mass tort situations).
102 Thus, the opinion begins by explaining that "[t] his case turns on the conditions
for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B)." Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.
Ct. 2295, 2302 (1999). Later the Court explained that "[t]he nub of this case is the
certification of the class under Rule 23(b) (1) (B)." I. at 2307.
103 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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(1) Should limited fund4 certification be forbidden altogether in
mass tort litigation?
(2) By what standard should the court determine whether there is
a limited fund?" 5
(3) If the "net assets plus insurance" approach may be used to deis the court to make the determine the available assets, how
00
cision what those assets total?'

The Court went out of its way not to answer this question. It emphasized at one
point that "[w]e do not, it is true, decide the ultimate question whether Rule
23(b) (1) (B) may ever be used to aggregate individual tort claims." 119 S. Ct. at 2314.
It also said that "we cannot settle all the details of a subdivision (b) (1) (B) limited fund
here (and so cannot decide the ultimate question whether settlements of multitudes of
related tort actions are amenable to mandatory class treatment)." Id. at 2312. On the
other hand, discussing the record before it, the Court said that "ifFibreboard's own
assets would not have been enough to pay the insurance shortfall plus any claims in
excess of policy limits, the projected insolvency of the insurers and Fibreboard would
have indicated a truly limited fund." Id. at 2318. Therefore, the question seems open
even under the current rule.
105 The Court noted that the lower courts had developed two standards for demonstrating a limited fund-that the adjudication of individual claims "will inescapably
compromise" the claims of others, or that there is a "substantial probability" such a
compromise will occur. Id. at 2316 n.26. It declined to decide the appropriate standard because the case before it did not satisfy either. See id.
'6 The Court clearly held that the technique used in Ortizwas not proper, and that
there must be a proceeding in the district court in which the proponents of limited
fund treatment proffer evidence demonstrating the extent of assets available to pay
claims. See id. at 2316. It observed that the insurance funds would be limited if there
were aggregate limits in the policies, or if the insurers would obviously be rendered
insolvent by success of many claimants. See id. at 2317. Since there was no such policy
aggregate limit, nor evidence of looming insolvency due to open-ended liability for the
insurers, these techniques did not work. The proponents of the settlement (and Justice Breyer in dissent, see id. at 2326-29) urged that the settlement reached with the insurers established such a limit since it represented a discounted valuation of the potential exposure that might be held unavailable altogether. The Court, however, held that
the negotiation did not provide a basis for accepting this theory since the lawyers negotiating for the plaintiff; had a conflict of interest due to the fact that they would receive
the proceeds of their separate settlement of pending claims only if the class settlement
survived fairness scrutiny. See id. at 2317. The Court did not, however, hold that this
discount method would always be improper in cases of disputes about insurance coverage. See id. ("This sense of limit as a value discounted by risk is of course a step removed from the historical model, but even on the assumption that it would suffice for
limited fund treatment, there was no adequate finding of fact to support its application
here.").
The additional question of noninsurance assets was not addressed by the Court, as
the amount of those assets seemed not to be disputed. The certainty that they would
not suffice should the insurance coverage disappear due to rulings in the California
104
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(4) How should
the court determine the total of probable
17
claims?
(5) Should claims for punitive damages be handled differently in
the limited fund scenario?'08
(6) If limited fund treatment is proper in a mass tort situation,
how should the fund be divided?1°9

state courts in the insurance coverage litigation was also undisputed. It is worth noting, however, that in other cases setting a proper valuation for a going concern can be
a challenge. In the A.H. Robins Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, Judge Williams
treated as sufficient a showing in 1981 that the noninsurance net worth of the company was $280 million. Six years later, however, bankruptcy proceedings led to sale of
the company for $2.475 billion, so the figure accepted by Judge Williams at least looks
dubious. For discussion, see Marcus, supra note 42, at 878-79.
107 In commercial cases, it may be appropriate to add up the claims in
all the cases,
but the Court recognized that this method would not work in mass tort cases. See Ortiz,
119 S. Ct. at 2316. As to both amount and likelihood of success on liability, there is no
reason to believe that because claimant number one recovers $X claimant number n
will recover some specific amount. See Marcus, supra note 42, at 878-79.
'03Certainly punitive damages sometimes seem the wild card of this sort of litigation. However much difficulty there may be in forecasting probable compensatory recoveries, there is likely to be even more in forecasting punitive awards. Ortiz sheds no
light on how to answer this question. It might be noted as well that the idea of subordinating punitive damages claims to compensatory damage claims in genuine limited
fund situations has some appeal, but would almost certainly be beyond the power of
the rules process.
Punitive damages also raise a separate problem of whether there is a legal limitation on total recoveries that could produce a different sort of limited fund situation.
Courts have speculated that there may be some limit on the recurrent imposition of
these damages, either as a matter of due process or as a matter of state law. Thus,
some courts have used a "limited generosity" theory to justify treating the prospect of
limits on punitive damage recoveries as warranting limited fund treatment. See, e.g., In
reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (asserting that
"[t]here must.., be some limit.., to the amount of times defendants may be punished for a single transaction"). Ortiz did not present this issue.
"9 I have previously observed that "Rule 23(b) (1) (B) simply does not prescribe any
standards for resolving competing claims to the limited fund, if one is found to exist."
Marcus, supra note 42, at 880. In Ortiz, the Court seemed to find an implicit standard
in the old cases it examined--"equity among members of the class." 119 S. Ct at 2318.
This appears to mean pro rata distribution. See id. at 2311-12, 2314 (justifying mandatory class treatment by referring to a limited fund, distributed on a pro rata basis, to
satisfy claims based on a common theory of liability). So Ortiz does provide some light,
but that raises the question of method of fixing the liabilities to be applied ratably
against the limited fund, possibly implicating the right to jury trial issue raised as item
(9) below.
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(7) What claimants have to be included?"
(8) Can the debtor keep part of its assets because of the transacdon costs saved by the combined resolution?"'
(9) How does the right
to jury trial bear on limited fund class ac2
tion settlements?
,10One of the problems with the limited fund class action, as compared to a bankruptcy, is that in effect it creates two classes of unsecured creditors. In bankruptcy, one
would normally expect all unsecured creditors to share ratably in the debtor's assets.
Based on its reading of cases using a limited fund technique before 1938, the Court
said in Ortiz that it was permissible to limit the class to those who "might state a claim
on a single or repeated set of facts, invoking a common theory of recovery, to be satisfied from the limited fund as the source of payment." Id. at 2311. In effect, then,
there are two categories of unsecured creditors-those with claims based on a common theory or set of facts, and those whose claims are founded on other facts or theories. This approach leads to problems the Court did not address.
One problem is determining how far this circle of "common theory" claimants
should be extended. In In re School Asbestos Litigation,789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986), the
court rejected a limited fund class action for punitive damages brought on behalf of
owners of properties who incurred costs removing asbestos. The claim was rejected in
part because personal injury plaintiffs were not included, but they might seek punitive
damages as well. Would this situation be treated as one in which the personal injury
claimants and property damages claimants are invoking a "common theory of recovery?" Another problem is explaining how the limited funds of the debtor can be subdivided so that some are available for one class of "common theory" claimants while
others are available for the rest. Unless the debtor can keep assets for the unsecured
creditors excluded from the "common theory" group, it is difficult to see how those
creditors can be kept out of the class action, or how a class action improves on
handling the problem through a bankruptcy proceeding.
..Fibreboard contributed only about five percent of its net worth to the settlement pot. Yet the Court noted that in most previous cases on which it relied "the
whole of the inadequate fund was to be devoted to the overwhelming claims." 119 S.
Ct. at 2311. If that were done in a case like Ortiz there would have to be provision for
all creditors, since otherwise the class would get all the assets and the other unsecured
creditors would have none left for them. If the "limited fund" is all of the debtor's assets, bankruptcy would seem preferable to limited fund certification. The district court
in Ortiz, however, found that the net worth of Fibreboard was less than the likely savings in defense costs resulting from the settlement. See id. The Court did not entirely
reject the idea that this argument could sometimes justify leaving equity in the debtor,
although the Court found the concept inapplicable to the case before it. See id. at 2321
& n.35. If there is no way to leave something on the table, all the other unsecured
creditors are deprived and there may be little incentive for companies to settle. Yet it
is odd that companies should achieve discounted resolution of the class members'
claims due to having limited assets while keeping significant portions of their assets.
Perhaps only Chapter 11 bankruptcy treatment should permit this sort of situation to
occur.
1
The Court noted that "certification of a mandatory class followed by settlement
of its action for money damages obviously implicates the Seventh Amendmentjury trial
rights of absent class members." IMat 2314. It is difficult to understand how the Sev-
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Obviously not all of these questions are susceptible to resolution
by rule amendment. The Court's opinion, however, is couched in
terms of the intentions of the rulemakers in 1966, and new intentions
could lead to different results. At least Chief Justice Rehnquist seems
confident that rule amendments could change the status quo regarding the issues addressed by the Court. 13 Thus that possibility seems
worthy of attention.
4. The amendments do not eliminate the problem
of the reverse auction.

By writing settlement classes into the rule without any specification about how the court should approach them differently (if at all),
the proposal does not address the problem of a reverse auction.1

4

5. The amendments only implicitly disavow the 1966 Advisory
Committee Note disapproving mass accident class actions.
In 1966, the rulemakers foresaw the use of the class action in mass
accident cases and tried to fend off that possibility with disapproving
language in the Committee Note." 5 Under the pressures of mass tort
litigation, the courts began in the 1980s to relax their opposition to
mass tort class actions. By then, at least, some of those connected to
the 1966 Advisory Committee Note had disavowed their prior attitudes."16 One does not amend rules to bury Notes, but given the
enth Amendment bears on settlement, or why it should only affect settlement of mandatory class actions. Is there no similar limitation on the settlement of suits under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (2) for injunctive relief? Is there a reason why
the settlement of the scope of defendant's violation of plaintiffs' rights or the proper
remedy is different when plaintiff has a right to jury trial? Unless one takes the view
that, if the Seventh Amendment does not apply, there is no constitutional right to a
"trial" at all, it is hard to understand why cases subject to the Seventh Amendment are
different from those that are not (as would be true in many 23(b) (2) class actions).
"3 See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
...
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
115

A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but also of liability and defenses of liability, would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances
an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice
into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee note to 1966 Amendments.
11 Professor Charles Alan Wright summarized his
views in court
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when
Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note say-
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prominence of this particular Note some official disavowal might be
urged. Amchem itself seems to have done the job, 117 however, so no
further action is required, and in any event a retreat from the 1966
Note seems implicit in the amendments proposed.
B. What the ProposedRule Amendments Do
1. The amendments provide enhanced settlement evaluation
guidance in Rule 23(e).
Although the framers of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 clearly
intended to permit settlement of class actions, and to make such settlements binding on class members, they provided courts with almost
no guidance for deciding whether to approve settlements. Fortifying
this provision
therefore seems a relatively obvious improvement on
118
the rule.
The proposed amendments ensure that there will be a hearing on

ing that mass torts are inappropriate for class certification. I thought then
that was true. I am profoundly convinced now that that is untrue. Unless we
can use the class action and devices built on the class action, our judicial system is simply not going to be able to cope with the challenge of the mass repetitive wrong....
Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa.
1984), quoted in HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 17.06, at 20 (3d ed. 1992).
Somewhat similarly, Judge JackWeinstein offered the following observations about
the Committee Note:
As authority for this warning against attempts to use class actions in torts, the
note cites an article [I] wrote as a law professor. As a judge [I have] been
forced to ignore this indiscretion when faced with the practicalities of mass
tort litigation. In the earlier 1960s we did not fully understand the implications of mass tort demands on our legal system.
Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 269, 288.
", The Court put the Note in its
place:
The Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that
"mass accident" cases are likely to present "significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses of liability,... affecting the individuals
in different ways." And the Committee advised that such cases are "ordinarily
not appropriate" for class treatment. But the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and district courts,
since the late 1970's, have been certifying such cases in increasing number.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citations omitted).
"" SeeWilliam W Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 841 (1995) (noting that "Rule 23 contains no standards at all
governingjudicial approval of class action settlements" and arguing that it should).
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the proposed settlement" 9 They provide that any class member may
object, and then obtain "discovery reasonably calculated to appraise
the apparent merits of the class claims, issues, or defenses, and to disclose the course of settlement negotiations and the terms of any incidental agreements or understandings. " 12
Whether this discovery
should reach all factors that the rule says bear on settlement could
present some interesting issues, for those factors include "the total resources available to the parties agreeing to pay money under the setdement" 2 1 and whether the attorneys fees proposed to be paid are
reasonable.12 2 The amendments also guarantee an award of attorneys
fees for a successful objection to the settlement and permit such an
award in connection with an unsuccessful objection.'20 Whether this
provision would provoke too many objections is debatable. There
were certainly vigorous objectors to the settlements in Amchem and Ortiz, but it is less clear whether objectors usually have been sufficiently
willing to get involved. In addition, the proposed amendment permits
the court to refer the initial appraisal of the settlement to a magistrate
judge or a person specially appointed for an independent investigation. 4 Some courts have appointed a guardian ad litem for a class in
the settlement context, and it is good to see this idea included in the
proposed rule.
Besides dealing with the procedure for settlement approval, the
proposed amendments list factors that the court should consider
"among other factors" in deciding whether to approve a proposed set-

tlement. Here maturity is the first consideration on the list, as it bears
on "the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial on the merits." 1'
This should go a considerable distance toward resolving the
concerns raised about the 1996 proposed amendments, 126 which included maturity as a factor that might work mischief in antitrust, employment discrimination, or securities fraud cases. Like a number of
cases,1 7 the factors call for a comparison of the likely outcome at trial
'9 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 1981 (Proposed Rule 23(e)(2)) ("The court may
not approve settlement.., without a hearing.").
120 Id. (Proposed Rule 23(e) (4)).
11 Id. at 1982 (Proposed Rule 23(e) (5)
(D)).
'2 See id. (Proposed Rule 23(e) (5) (H)).
123 See id. at 1981 (Proposed Rule 23(e) (4)).
124 See id.at 1982 (Proposed Rule 23(e) (6)).
'2 Id. (Proposed Rule 23(e) (5) (A)).
126 See Preliminary Draft, supra note 94.
1

See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 207 (5th Cir.

1981) (detailing standards for review of proposed settlement).
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with the risks and costs of trial.18
As noted below, it may be that such provisions can be adequately
spelled out by caselaw. 1 If a rule change is needed, however, these
specifics seem a very good starting place for developing a new Rule
23(e).
2. The amendments create an absolute right to opt out after
settlement notice is given in all class actions.
Presently, of course, the right to opt out exists only in Rule
23(b) (3) class actions, and it is not connected to settlement, although
it may be made available at the time of settlement if the class has not
been certified theretofore. The proposed amendment radically enlarges the role of the opt-out, providing that a settlement of a class action binds a class member only after notice of the terms of the settlement is provided to the class member and a chance to opt out is
afforded the class member.iss
Some may believe recent developments to indicate that there
must always be an opt-out right because due process permits binding
effect only where one exists.'
But none of the cases on which this
view is based involved the sorts of claims asserted in traditional Rule
23(b) (1) and (b) (2) classes, and it is hard to believe that these class
actions are necessarily burdened with ensuring a right to opt out to
make them constitutional.
Such a right would seem impossible to implement in some (b) (2)
situations. 32 In a school desegregation class action, for example, what
exactly does it mean to say that some members of the plaintiff class
have opted out? Are they then exempt from the remedy developed by
' See, eg., Cooper, supra note 1, at 1982 (Proposed Rule 23(e) (5) (C), (E), and
(F)).

' See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
'3nSee Cooper, supranote 1, at 1981 (Proposed Rule 23 (e) (3)). This right does not

exist if the class member was notified of a "less favorable" settlement and did not then
opt out. See id.
'"" Professor Hazard's paper for this symposium suggests such a view, at least as to
future claimants. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1901 (2000).

See Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the district
court abused its discretion in allowing opt-outs in a (b) (2) class action); see also
Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[A]s a general matter,
courts should not permit opt-outs when doing so would undermine the policies behind
(b) (1) or (b) (2) certification .... .");In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187 F.R.D. 549
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (providing that the class action is binding with regard to equitable
relief, but allowing class members to opt out of monetary relief provisions).
132
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the court? In cases involving structural injunctions, this sort of solution will not work. True, there may be serious disagreements within

the class about what remedy to seek-such as whether plaintiffs
should prefer busing or other measures to deal with the problems
caused by past discrimination.,3 Some may feel that these suits are artifacts of the past, but they are still being filed. 134 There are serious
drawbacks to allowing opting out of (b) (2) classes that are settled.
Similar difficulties would result from allowing opting out in (b) (1)
class actions. The central reality is that Rule 23(b) (1) provides an adjunct to Rule 19 for cases in which the necessary parties are too numerous to be joined. But the thrust of Rule 19 is to require that the
absent parties be joined if it is feasible to do so, not just if they want to
be.15 Allowing them a right to opt out is inconsistent with the motivation for (b) (1) treatment. Recall the motivation for using this provision in mass tort cases-intercepting early punitive damage claims
that would siphon off funds otherwise available for paying compensatory damages.16 Although there have been extraordinary cases in
which opting out in (b) (1) class actions has been allowed,'3 7 the idea is
3

For a discussion of these problems, see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:

Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 86 YALE LJ. 470
(1976); cf. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lauyers in Civil Rights Campaigns,106YALE L.J. 1623 (1997) (discussing the
tension between individualism and group interests in such litigation).
This sort of tension is not limited to school desegregation. Consider, for example,
Pratt v. Chicago HousingAuthority, 155 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ill. 1994), in which residents of
facilities operated by the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA"), represented by civil liberties lawyers, sued the CHA challenging the constitutionality of its tough new policy of
warrantless searches of apartments in response to incidents of violence or gunfire.
The problem was that the raids never occurred sooner than two days after the event in
question, and the court initially certified a class of residents of the CHA projects to
challenge the policy. Thereafter the Local Advisory Council presidents for 18 of the 19
CHA developments moved to intervene on the defense side and presented a petition
signed by 5000 other CHA tenants applauding the CHA's efforts to respond to violence in the projects. The court decertified the class. Would it have been sufficient to
allow opting out? How much difference would that make if the court entered an injunction against the new policy?
14 See, e.g., NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690 (M.D. Ga.
1999) (certifying (b) (2) class in suit alleging that school district engages in racial segregation).
'" See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) (directing that such people "shall be joined" if their
joinder will not deprive the court of subject matterjurisdiction).
'16 See supranotes 38-39 and accompanying text.
'37 See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding the district court's decision to allow a class member that had already litigated an individual claim to judgment at great expense to opt out of a Rule 23 (b) (1)
class action).
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incompatible with the reason for having a mandatory class in the first
place.
Moreover, allowing a right to opt out in the proposed rule
amendment is jarringly different from the treatment of similar issues
under the § 1335A proposal discussed above. The statute would direct
that all present and future claimants, defendants, and insurers be
joined and that none can opt out. If due process requires a right to
opt out, it is surely curious to suggest a statute that would ensnare the
world.
Yet another curious feature of this right to opt out is that it exists
only in the event of settlement. What exactly does that mean? In
(b) (2) actions, there may be considerable litigation before such a settlement emerges. Consider Martin v. Wihs,3 in which there was very
vigorous litigation of employment discrimination claims against the
City of Birmingham, Alabama, leading ultimately to a settlement
about the decree that should be entered to undo the discriminatory
practices the court had found to exist. There is some reason to think
that this sort of negotiated decree is common in structural injunction
cases, where the court lacks expertise to design the decree and the law
condemns certain practices but does not prescribe a specific solution
to the problems they create. 9 Martin v. Wilks dealt with the question
whether the resulting decree could bind whites who were not included in the class, but did not suggest that the class members themselves were entitled to a right to opt out after the settlement was announced.
Some of those class members also opposed the
settlement;o would class members under the new rule have an automatic right to opt out in such a case? How then would the city handle
them in its hiring and promotion decisions? Imposing the opt-out
right on settled (b) (2) actions seems likely to work considerable mischief.
The settlement opt out raises interesting questions in connection
with (b) (3) damage actions as well. If the critical objective of the optout right is to make the binding effect of the decree consensual, one
could also ask why the opt-out right does not apply if the case is fully
litigated. Under current Rule 23(c) (2), of course, there is a right to
s 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
See Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.

"9

L. REV.

1281, 1298-1300 (1976) (suggesting that such negotiated decrees are probably the
norm in public law litigation).

Martin, 490 U.S. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing objections of a
group of black firefighters that the settlement's provisions were inadequate).
14
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opt out even though the case was certified for litigation, albeit not one
required to be made available after a settlement is announced. 4 Perhaps the notion is that if a damages class action is suitable for litigation we have no reason to worry about the remedy afforded after trial
because that is our best approximation of what the parties should receive. If the case is certified for full litigation, however, one would
think that the reverse-auction problem14 has largely been solved since
the plaintiffs' lawyers have the threat of trial to back up their settlement negotiations. What reason is there to guarantee a second right
to opt out if there is a settlement?
Finally, it is worth noting that the opt-out right dooms any settled
class action involving future class members unless all of them in effect
are to occupy an "opt in" status. There is obviously no way to notify
them about the terms of the decree. Consider again the school desegregation case. Children who have not yet entered school (perhaps
not even been born) would normally be included in a class consisting
of present and future students in the school system. How will the decree work if each of them can opt out on reaching school age?
In sum, there are many reasons to approach the proposed opt-out
provision with great caution.
3. The amendments authorize class certification solely for settlement
purposes in (b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions.
The Advisory Committee's 1996 proposal for settlement class actions was limited to cases brought under (b) (3).14 But mass tort class
actions often are packaged under other portions of Rule 23. We have
already seen the variety of questions that persist about using Rule
23 (b) (1) (B) in such cases.'" Such cases may also be packaged as
(b) (2) class actions when they assert some sort of medical monitoring
claim.'4 Broadening the settlement class authority in this way would
capture these situations.
The problem is that it would capture a great deal more and disre-

"' Indeed, the provision in Rule 23(c) (1) that the certification decision be made
"[a]s soon as practicable" would seem to mean that there would often be a delay between notice and the consummation of a settlement.
142 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
4

See Preliminary Draft, supranote 94, at 559 (proposing new Rule 23(b) (4)).

114 See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 174 F.R.D. 396, 406-08 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)
(certifying medical monitoring class under (b) (2) for women subjected to experiment
using radioactive isotopes).
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gard the fundamental idea of a mandatory class, a point analogous to
the one made about allowing opting out in such cases.1 The basic
idea of a mandatory class is that everyone has to be joined in the same
proceeding or the objectives of Rule 19 will be fi-ustrated. 147 If that

predicate is satisfied, class certification is mandatory in the sense that
the court must do it for all purposes, notjust settlement. So the entire
idea of a settlement class seems at odds with the precepts of (b) (1),
and probably (b) (2).

In sum, the rule amendment proposal offers promise of clarifying
and improving practice under Rule 23(e), but other features of the
proposal cause great uneasiness.
Given that important ruleinterpretation questions are omitted and presumably left to caselaw
development, it may be that benign neglect is again the wisest course.
IV. SHOULD BENIGN NEGLECT AGAIN BE EMBRACED?

Certainly the state of race relations in this country does not indicate that benign neglect was the best policy for them. This paper
raises devil's advocate arguments for persisting in the 1978 decision of
the Advisory Committee not to propose substantial changes for Rule
23, and leaving the question to Congress. 148 It attempts to identify
reasons for considering Professor Cooper's proposals for legislation or
rule amendment insufficient-discussing the features they lack-as
well as reasons for thinking them overkill-exploring the possible disadvantages of the features they have.

146
147

See supraPart III.B.2.

Consider the views of Judge Heaney, dissenting from a ruling that the Anti-

Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, precluded an injunction against state-court litigation
by class members in connection with an alleged Rule 23(b) (1) (B) federal-court class
action:
A mandatory class action, of course, has a restrictive effect on related proceedings in any other court-state or federal. This is because, by definition,
members of such a class cannot pursue independent litigation of class
claims.... [T]he implication of the majority's view is that mandatory classes
are not truly mandatory-any member who has previously commenced independent litigation is somehow not subject to the ordinary rules of such class
actions.
In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1191 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
"3 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Beyond those concerns, there are other considerations that one
trying to decide whether to persist in a policy of benign neglect might
think important. Accordingly, the paper will end with a list of some of
those:
1. Can the desirable changes be effected without passing legislation
or amending Rule 23?
Obviously some cannot, or at least cannot easily. For the federal
courts to curtail inappropriate state court class certification, for example, requires legislation absent a constitutional ground for invalidating such class certification.
Other positive developments might be achievable by caselaw. The
proposed amendment to Rule 23 to provide directives about how to
handle the question of class settlement approval' 49 would replace the
delphic current rule language with much helpful detail. But there is
no longer a clean slate in interpreting Rule 23(e). The courts have
been working out the ways to handle it since 1967, when a district
court in Philadelphia first confronted the question whether court approval was required in a settled case in which a class had not yet been
certified.'15 This effort has yielded may opinions since; Professor
Cooper thus correctly cites Judge Scirica's thoughtful discussion of
these problems in a 1998 case. 5' Amending the rule would not throw
all this judicial experience out the window; the proposed amendment
lists factors that may be pertinent "among other factors." 52 But one
could at least ask whether there is a need to revise a rule when there is
already a body of interpretive (and creative) caselaw, as well as considerable treatment of the problems in the treatises.'
2. Is it desirable to undermine the transsubstantive orientation
of the rules in this way?
The rules' transsubstantive orientation has come under much at19
150

See supra text accompanying notes 118-28.
See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa.

1967) (holding that if precertification settlement purports to resolve class claims it is
covered by FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)).
15 SeeIn rePrudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 316-24 (3d
Cir. 1998) (discussing a variety of factors pertinent to assessing adequacy of proposed
settlement), cited in Cooper, supra note 1, at 1986.
152 Cooper, supra note 1, at 1981-82 (Proposed Rule 23(e) (5)).
"' See, e.g., 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 10,
§ 1797.1 (discussing the
factors considered for approval of Rule 28 settlements).
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tack recently, but it is still a fundamental feature of the overall
scheme. As Professor Carrington has reminded us in the pages of this
journal,'5 there are profound risks associated with making rules for
only one kind of case. But that is clearly what the all-encompassing
solution proposed by Professor Cooper would do. Indeed, his proposed new Rule 23.3 would override "inconsistent" provisions of other
Civil Rules as well. That sort of thing is not unprecedented,'55 but
might wisely be avoided. On the other hand, including all types of actions under the proposed amendment to Rule 23 creates problems of
its own by threatening undesirable results in cases that are not mass
torts.'

3. Should the judicial Branch abandon the field?
It is too late in the day to believe that the Judicial Branch can stop
procedural development by deciding that it is unwarranted. If the
Civil Justice Reform Act57 did not prove that, the Private Securities

Litigation Reform Act should have. So the pleasant notion that the
transsubstantive ideal can be pursued without regard to political realities should perhaps be banished.
Leadership and sage counsel are extremely important in the difficult activity of fashioning appropriate methods of addressing these
problems. One could easily say that Congress has evinced some willingness to move quickly with dubious solutions. For the Advisory
Committee (or other pertinent parts of the Judicial Branch) to foreclose participation could be a very large mistake.
4. Is it too soon to act?
It is hard to identify a congeries of procedural problems that has
received more attention over the last decade than mass torts. One
might even suggest that this mass torts symposium be the last one for a

'" See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure,137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2069-87 (1989) (examining the risks of shifting to substance-specific rules).
"' See SUPP. RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY & MARL. CLAIMS, Supp. Rule A, ("The
general Rules of Civil Procedure... are also applicable to the foregoing proceedings
except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these Supplemental Rules.").
156 See supranotes 130-46 and accompanying text.
157 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (requiring each
district to develop a
plan to reduce litigation cost and delay).
15 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 27, 109 Stat. 737, 738 (1995) (altering handling of securities

fraud suits, including class action practices).
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while. Yet we must also keep in mind what Judge Becker said about
these problems in 1998: "In my 27 years on the bench, I have never
seen an area in as much ferment as this class action area is, this mass
tort and consumer class action is now."'59 Trying to fashion final solutions to these problems before the ferment settles down further may
be unwise.
5. Are we fighting the last war?
Writing about the class action tumult in 1979, Professor Miller
enumerated the types of cases in which class actions were thought to
matter-antitrust, civil rights, consumer, environmental, and the
like-but there was no mention of personal injury tort suits.
That
was not surprising given the antagonistic Advisory Committee Note,""
but it should give us pause. The tocsin for using class actions in mass
torts was sounded by Judge Williams' 62 only two years later, yet Miller
(then Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules) did not
see this problem coming. The problems that weighed so heavy in
1979, meanwhile, had largely disappeared a decade later. How confident can we be that today's problems will persist and that there is not
something new just around the comer that will preoccupy us in ten
years?
6. Unless we act on what we have learned, will that mean that
all this effort was in vain?
The Advisory Committee has been working on the issue of class
actions and mass torts for almost a decade. It has sponsored a number of conferences, issued proposed amendments that generated four
volumes of analysis,'6 and prompted the formation of the Mass Torts
Working Group, which issued its own extensive report with a large appendix.164 The process has involved innumerable lawyers, judges, and
law professors.
Even if no statute or rule change results from this activity, it has
"' The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases: A Roundtable Discussion, 66
FORDHAm L. REv. 1657, 1667 (1998) (comments ofJudge Becker).
16' See Miller,

supranote 23, at 670-75 (enumerating types of cases that raised class

action problems but not mentioning torts).
161See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
'62 See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
'6

See ADVISORY

COMM. ON CIvIL

RUIS, 1-4 WORKING

PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997).
1" See REPORT ON MASS TORT LIIGATION, supra note 21.
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provided immense value to the handling of these cases. For one
thing, the work product of this activity provides an invaluable resource
for those who now and later address these questions. For another, the
process of amassing this database has disseminated and improved the
knowledge available. The spread and improvement of knowledge may
be the most important way of solving the present problems, rather
than legislation or rulemaking. So if benign neglect prevails, and neither new rules nor new statutes emerge, there is nevertheless reason
for the Advisory Committee to think that this has been a job well
done.
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